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Editorial
Australia and western civilisation - then and now
On 25 April this year, Australians and New Zealanders will mark the centenary of 
the Gallipoli campaign during the First World War. It was the quintessential example 
of soldiers from ‘down under’ laying down their lives for the British Empire in a war 
fought on the other side of the globe. Today, the remit of ANZAC day has widened 
to commemorate all citizens of the two countries that have served and died in 
military conflicts abroad. Its original disposition, however, was to commemorate 
the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps that fought at Gallipoli. 
The date 25 April was officially named ANZAC Day in 1916, a year after the landing 
at the Gallipoli peninsula. Allied forces were seeking to establish a naval pathway to 
the Black Sea and, in a longer perspective, to defeat the Ottoman Empire in its own 
heart, Constantinople. The campaign turned to be drawn-out and costly, resulting 
in evacuation by the end of the year following heavy casualties. But the contribution 
by Australians and New Zealanders became the source of a legend which is vibrant 
to this day. It is a legend that portrays the two countries as guardians of liberal 
democracy and western civilisation, at the same time as it confirms their historical relationship to Britain.
A century later, Australia finds itself as a crossroads regarding its national identity 
and self-perception. What is its position in the world, and what should it be? 
Australia is a parliamentary democracy that retains Britain’s monarch as its head 
of state. As a ceremonial homage to its former imperial centre, Queen Elizabeth II 
remains the Queen of Australia. Institutional bonds remain, and they are honoured 
not only on historical grounds but for political reasons too. Australia seems to lack 
the confidence to find a more independent place in the world, Callum McEachern 
argues elsewhere on these pages. While geographically, Australia is far from the 
western civilisation of Europe and North America, its geopolitical reference points 
remain Britain and the United States. 
In the present issue of British Politics Review we offer a number of different 
perspectives on the British-Australian relationship, historically and today. Tracing 
the roots of the multifaceted relationship also helps explain its nature today, 
ranging from political parties and ideologies via the position of the Aboriginal 
people to the prestige and position of the monarchy. While a century has passed 
since Gallipoli, the sense of a value-based commitment to a common past lingers on, 
but in a different environment. Might the coming century bring other orientations 
quietly to the fore?
Øivind Bratberg and Atle L. Wold (editors)
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Unlike neutral Norway, World War 
1 severely interrupted the building 
of distinctive ‘place-based’ national 
identities in Australia and New 
Zealand. In the decades prior to 
Gallipoli, literature and arts were 
forging closer relationships between 
the land, political ideals and national 
visions. People relished the prospects 
of shaping their self-image free from 
the privileges of semi-feudal Britain 
and America’s heritage of bloody 
independence and civil wars. 
Instead, despite living on the edge of ‘the ocean of peace’ 
(The Pacific), national identity became shaped by sacrifice 
on northern hemisphere battlefields. Ever since there has 
been a quiet sense of muted, maybe arrested, development 
of national narratives; a situation extended by globalisation 
of English-speaking cultures.
Every new nation seeks recognition and respect on the 
world stage. Although our natural elements of place 
encouraged prowess in sport, inventiveness and the 
arts, the desire to quickly prove self-worth and forge 
collective identity led to a war zone.  It is an enigma that 
Australians, and to lesser extent New Zealanders, continue 
to allow their national narratives to be shaped elsewhere 
and adopt a role in world affairs akin to more militaristic 
and jingoistic cultures. Despite shared characteristics 
with Norwegians, we passed up the opportunity to be 
consistent, independent peacemakers in world, as Norway 
has done since Fridtjof Nansen’s post WW1 efforts. 
The original fear of being the isolated ‘white tribes of 
Asia’ has resulted in a sense of insecurity that is not 
clearly articulated, especially by Australian politicians. 
In dealings with northern hemisphere powers, the 
desire for reaffirmation of respect has led to a self-image 
based on ‘punching above our weight’. It allows us to be 
flattered at a Texan barbeque and turn the F-35 strike 
fighter into a ‘flying open cheque book’. As some defence 
analysts suggest, the new focus on weapons designed 
for deployment far from home (including armed drones), 
is being quarantined from the current intense economic 
debate. It is as if we wish to be protected from knowing too much.
The trauma of the ‘baptism of fire’ on Turkey’s Gallipoli 
beach deeply impacted the Australian and New Zealander 
psyche. Unknown by most Australians, New Zealand lost 
far more lives per capita and has been more cautious about war ever since. After Gallipoli enthusiasm for the war 
ebbed early and in two referenda Australians rejected 
conscription. With the ‘national romanticism’ that had 
boosted self-confidence now waning, all that remained 
was courageous survival and mateship. Officially this 
became the ‘ANZAC spirit’; a story of endurance as much 
as bravery. It filled the void of a national narrative being 
‘nipped in the bud’. 
The ANZAC ‘legend’ was actually based on the attributes 
and values emerging from real life experiences on home 
soil - in ‘the bush’-  hostile landscapes like Australia’s 
vast dry interior and New Zealand’s rugged mountains. 
Survival required cooperation, fairness and honesty, which 
encouraged egalitarianism. This vision of democratic 
nations based on environmental influences and ‘virtues of 
necessity’ was expressed effectively by poets. One was a 
son of a Norwegian sailor, Henry Lawson, the other, Banjo 
Patterson, whose ballad ‘Waltzing Matilda’ became the 
unofficial national anthem. It is an emotional and semi-
spiritual lament of struggle against vested powers, ending 
in death. The ‘emptiness’ is reinforced by Australia’s failure, 
unlike New Zealand, to fully accept that the land was 
home to people when Europeans arrived. The Australian 
Constitution still does not recognise Indigenous peoples, 
despite the proof that they served at Gallipoli.
When, on Australia Day this year, Prime Minister Abbott 
gave the nation’s highest honour – a knighthood – to the 
husband of the British monarch, he dismayed Australians 
and bewildered New Zealanders. A century after apparent 
independence, political and cultural cringe to both English 
aristocracy and deference to the US, haunts national 
identity. The lack of confidence to find a more independent 
place in the world reflects self-doubt in political decision-
making and it disturbs many. What has changed since the 
first ANZACs were controlled from Whitehall?
There is widespread unease that Hollywood-style 
‘patriotic’ fervour for war heroes is being encouraged by 
government and some media. A day before PM Abbott’s 
British deference, the top country musician warned that 
Gallipoli should not be about flag-waving but reflection 
on ‘a national tragedy’. A few ‘patriots’ then suggested this 
‘boy from the bush’ was too sentimental about peace. 
In his official 2014 ANZAC day speech, the widely 
respected late Governor of Tasmania (the British Queen’s 
representative) Peter Underwood, called for a ‘year of 
peace’ to commemorate Gallipoli. Although he made 
no reference to the Middle East, hard-line conservative 
politicians attacked him for being ‘pro-Palestine’. It shone 
light on a context that is rarely discussed, although retired 
senior Labour party figures are concerned that the ‘Israeli 
government lobby’ now has excessive influence over 
foreign policy.3
Australia and New Zealand: displaced narratives and the 
centennial ANZAC day
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This is the paradox of 
the ‘war on terror’. Not only is a new wave of 
theocracy weakening 
secular democracies 
and nation states in 
the Middle East, it is 
impacting closer to home. With attention 
on the rise of radical 
Islam, overall geo-political tensions are 
being fuelled further 
by extremist elements within the other two 
religions that share 
the heritage of the 
Old Testament. Ultra-
orthodox Jews and 
the mainly US-based 
‘neo Christians’ also 
share another belief 
with radical Islamists 
– Armageddon – 
prophesised destruction of the world as a means to an end. 
The spread of hard-line fundamentalism into political 
ideology has been noticeable across the English-speaking 
world. Religious rhetoric is influencing public policies 
through online ‘debates’ increasingly characterised by 
hate, intolerance and fear. Yet US citizen Murdoch, who 
dominates Australian media, considers any criticism of 
Judeo-Christian extremists to be taboo.
Most of the new ‘micro’ parties also communicate 
implied or explicit Islamic-phobia and have high-jacked 
the national flag symbols. Globally-networked ‘identity 
politics’ is translating ancient theology into ideology. 
Ironically, even new US-style libertarian parties ignore 
the risk of theocracies eroding democracies.
Unresolved geo-political tensions of the Middle East have 
stalked the ANZAC story for a hundred years. WW1 did 
not install western ‘civilisation’ nor peace in the region. 
One beneficial consequence in the wake of the war was the transformation of the Ottoman Empire into a secular 
Turkish state; a nation now pivotal in confronting ISIS in 
Syria and Iraq. However, failure to implement the 1917 
Balfour Declaration calling for both Palestinian and Jewish 
states has continued to block a possible path to peaceful 
co-existence. Moreover, Britain alongside western 
powers has found it impractical to honour the ideas of 
liberal democracy and national self-determination that 
the war propagandised to favour.
Back home, the accelerating polarisation of domestic 
politics along new sectarian lines will only increase 
Australian sense of insecurity. Strained relations with 
Indonesia, the world’s 
largest Muslim country, require 
governments to take citizens into 
confidence and build 
understanding of complex issues; 
something that did not happen with the 
Vietnam or Iraq wars. 
US suggestions that Australia may have to choose loyalty 
between it and Asia (especially China) 
only adds to anxieties 
about the realities of place. However, New 
Zealand has long 
identified itself as a 
South Pacific nation. 
In doing so, it also 
learned the lessons 
that distant allies can readily forgo mutual defence 
obligations, if something like ‘nuclear free’ upsets them.
New Zealand is so comfortable with its place in the world, 
that conservatives support the quest for a distinctive 
new flag. The silver fern on a black background, long 
identified with kiwi sport, is likely. But the Aussie sporting 
equivalent, the green and gold wattle seems destined 
never to replace the red, white and blue of the Union Jack. 
It is literally a ‘security blanket’, sharing the colours of the 
stars and stripes, and in turn exclusive ‘shared values’. 
Since Gallipoli, Australia and NZ have had little time 
and space to reassess their role as ‘ready allies’. The 
unprecedented invasion of Iraq disturbed Australia’s 
Returned Services League but after invoking ‘ANZAC 
loyalty’, the policy decision was successfully ‘hidden 
behind the troops’ and public opinion softened. It appears 
that the ANZAC narrative is too easily appropriated. 
How ANZAC will be commemorated on April 25 after 100 
years will provide an insight into the nations’ capacities 
for critical reflection beyond emotional symbolism. The 
sacredness of ANZAC may mean we are reluctant to do so. 
If so, the ‘national tragedy’ could haunt us further.
In 2002, when the last ANZAC, Alec Campbell, died, the 
Tasmanian capital’s streets fell silent. We sensed the 
sunshine and bird calls that fresh morning in a moment of 
deep, deep emotion. As with all ANZAC survivors, Alec had 
only spoken of the horrors of war and the need to pursue 
peace. The link to real reflection passed with him. In this 
era of fast, fragile communication, ‘Lest We Forget’.
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”The Last Post” is played at an ANZAC Day ceremony in Port Melbourne, Victoria, 25 
April 2005. The trumpet call is used at Commonwealth military funerals and ceremonies 
commemorating those who have been killed in war.
On 22 August 1770, Captain James 
Cook climbed the highest peak 
of Possession Island and ‘in the 
Name of His Majesty King George 
the Third took possession of the 
whole Eastern Coast’. This was the 
formal beginning of the relationship 
between Australia and the British 
monarchy. With Cook’s declaration 
and the celebratory firing of ‘three 
Volleys of small arms’ the ancestral 
home of some 500 Indigenous clans 
became Crown Land. With the arrival 
of the First Fleet on 26 January 1788, 
this theoretical dispossession became 
reality for the Eora people who lived in 
the Sydney basin.
Throughout the nineteenth century, the monarchy was a 
powerful symbol for the white colonists. Lacking the ancient 
connection to the land that marked the Aborigines, the new 
Australians found in the monarchy a vital source of cultural 
identity. After her ascension in 1837, the rapidly developing 
Eastern seaboard had endless enthusiasm for honouring 
their young Queen. Separated from New South Wales in 
1851 and 1859 respectively, Victoria and Queensland were 
both named in honour of the British monarch. Streets, 
schools, theatres, hospitals and other buildings throughout 
Australia were all eponymously named for Queen Victoria 
and the trend has continued for all her successors.
It was not until 1954 that a reigning monarch would set 
foot on the soil claimed 184 years earlier. Queen Elizabeth 
II’s royal tour met with 
jubilant crowds. Prime Minister 
Robert Menzies 
typified the n a t i o n a l s e n t i m e n t when he f a m o u s l y 
declared, ‘I did 
but see her 
passing by and 
yet I love her 
till I die’. The 
Queen was 
(and perhaps still is) the 
very symbol of Britishness 
and for 
a nation that identified as Australian Britons, her 
visit sparked excitement rarely seen before or since.
Despite this outpouring of emotion, just a decade later, two 
powerful voices began a national conversation that has 
not yet been resolved. Donald Horne’s now iconic text, The 
Lucky Country (1964), and Geoffrey Dutton’s collection of 
essays, Australia and the Monarchy (1966), both dared to 
ask if the Queen was still a viable symbol of the Australian 
people. The 1960s was a perfect time to ask such a question. 
Economically, Britain had turned away from Australia and 
was preparing to join the European Economic Community. 
Militaristically, Britain had been replaced by the United 
States as Australia’s powerful ally. Culturally, Australians 
began to think of themselves as an independent people.
Prime ministerial rhetoric soon caught up with changing 
public sentiment. At the outbreak of World War I, 
Andrew Fisher promised that Australia would defend 
Britain to the ‘last man and last shilling’. Menzies proudly 
described himself as ‘British to the bootstraps’. By the 
1960s this had all changed. With the Vietnam War as 
a backdrop, Harold Holt built on John Curtin’s ‘look to 
America’ speech and declared the nation would go ‘all 
the way with LBJ’. John Gorton intentionally contrasted 
Menzies by calling himself, ‘Australian to the boot heels’.
Australia continued to slowly replace the imperial symbols 
that once held pride of place in the national psyche. In 1975 
the Order of Australia replaced the British awards system. 
With the slow demise of Empire Day in the 1960s, Australia 
Day became the focus of national celebrations. God Save 
the Queen was finally replaced with Advance Australia Fair 
in 1984 and the Australia Acts 
of 1986 cut the 
last legislative 
ties between 
Australia and the British pa rl ia ment . 
The last 
formal and constitutional 
link between 
Australia and Britain was the monarchy which still 
p r o v i d e d Australia with 
a head of state.
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Mosaic picture of Queen Elizabeth II, produced by Helen Marshall using more than 5,000 photos of people 
in celebration of the Diamond Jubilee in 2012. Towner Gallery in Eastbourne, England.  The Queen is Head 
of State in 16 of the 53 member states in the Commonwealth of Nations, including Australia.
During the 1988 Bicentennial, Prince Charles and Princess 
Diana were the focal point of the national gaze. The Queen 
also visited to open the new parliament building with then 
opposition leader, John Howard, remarking that she was the 
‘pinnacle of our democracy’. That Australia’s most significant 
national celebration since Federation was dominated 
by British Royalty irked many and a formal republican 
movement was born. 
Initially led by author Thomas Keneally but soon driven by 
Malcolm Turnbull, the Australian Republican Movement 
(ARM) was launched on 7 July 1991 with the stated aim of 
achieving a republic by 2001, the centenary of Federation. 
The governing Labor Party, led by Paul Keating, gave its full 
support to the mission. Keating was defeated by conservative 
and monarchist, John Howard in 1996, but support for a 
republic continued to grow. Polls in the late 1990s indicate 
that public support for a republic was strong with results 
varying from mid-60s and low70s. Despite this, the public 
were split on what kind of republic. The Labor Party and 
ARM supported a minimalist model where the Queen would 
be replaced by an Australian president. Like the Queen, the 
President would be a ceremonial figurehead, selected by a 
2/3 majority of parliament. Reformist republicans insisted 
on change of a larger scale with a President directly voted 
for by the public. The schism proved great enough that 
prominent reformist republicans joined the official No team 
and campaigned against the referendum. 
The day of the referendum, 6 November 1999, coincided 
with the Rugby World Cup final in Cardiff. Australia’s 
Wallabies were triumphant but the referendum failed, 
securing 45 precent of the popular vote. The front page of the Sydney Morning Herald showed the Queen presenting 
Australian captain and staunch republican John Eales with 
the Webb Ellis Cup with the caption, ‘your cup, my country’. 
There was no second referendum with a direct-election 
model and, despite a general feeling that a republic would 
eventually happen, the status quo has seemed secure since.
The monarchy in Australia has proved remarkably 
adaptable. It was once seen as a unifying force, a symbol 
of the nation above the mire of partisan politics. This is 
clearly no longer the case. Even among monarchists, few 
would argue that the Queen is a relevant symbol of modern 
Australia. The monarchy has largely retreated from 
public view in Australia. While visits from the Queen and 
especially the media-friendly Prince William, Catherine 
and baby George, are still newsworthy events, they soon 
fade into the background. The arguments used by the No 
camp before the referendum did not highlight the merits of 
monarchy but the stability of the system and the potential 
problems with a republican model.
Australia’s last two prime ministers have both been 
republicans but neither Kevin Rudd nor Julia Gillard made 
any attempt to further the cause. Gillard even renamed 
a prominent Canberran street after the Queen that had 
formally honoured Sir Henry Parkes, Australia’s Father of 
Federation. Treasurer Wayne Swan and Malcolm Turnbull 
attempted to breathe new life into the movement by 
endorsing a collection of essays titled Project Republic in 
2013 but little else has been done. Australia’s current Prime 
Minister, Tony Abbott is the former head of Australians 
for Constitutional Monarchy and has written two books 
arguing against a republic. Shortly after his election in 
2013 he reinstated knights and dames to Australia despite 
anticipating ridicule. With Prince Harry in Sydney for the 
naval fleet review, he apologised that Australians were not 
all monarchists. At his swearing in, Abbott reversed the 
trend of Labor Prime Ministers and swore allegiance to the 
Queen rather than to the Australian people. While Abbott’s 
devotion to the monarchy is clear, it does not reflect the 
Australian mood or even the sentiment of his own party which is split on the issue. 
Ever since radical Scottish preacher Dr John Dunmore 
Lang declared an Australian republic to be a great ‘coming 
event’ in the mid-nineteenth century, it has been assumed, 
in Australia and Britain, that it is inevitable. This sense of 
destiny has perhaps removed any urgency. In principle, 
most agree that an Australian should be the Australian 
Head of State but the old adage ‘if it aint broke, don’t fix it’ has proven tenacious.
Mark McKenna’s excellent work, The Captive Republic, 
remains the authoritative history of republicanism in 
Australia. The republic indeed is like a captive bird although 
the cage door is open. It only awaits the motivation to fly. 
Many agree with former Prime Minister Bob Hawke, 
that the end of the Queen’s reign will be the catalyst for 
republican change. It is true that Prince Charles does not 
command the same respect as his mother but the issue is 
likely more nuanced than relative popularity. Australia 
has slid into a comfortable coexistence with the British 
monarchy. With an unwritten convention that the King or 
Queen will never use their considerable reserve powers to interfere with national politics, many are happy or at least 
indifferent with the present arrangement. As a politically 
neutral Head of State, the monarchy is sometimes seen as 
a mere reminder of Australia’s imperial past. The prospect 
of King Charles gracing every Australian coin will spark 
discussion but it is unlikely to bring about a republic. 
Australians have historically not had to think about 
national symbols as they were simply inherited from the mother country. While post-colonialism saw many nations 
hurriedly remove the Union Jack from their flags, it is a cause Australians have shown little interest in. Since the turn of 
the twentieth century visit of French writer, Albert Métin, 
Australians have been characterised as a practical people, 
more interested in the functionality than ideology of politics. Without some new impetus to cause national introspection 
and a new conversation on identity, the monarchy will 
continue to find a place in the Australian constitution if not 
the minds and hearts of the people.
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In the Northern Territory of Australia 
today a government intervention, 
prompted by high rates of alcoholism 
and child abuse within Aboriginal 
communities, is causing a storm of controversy. At issue is whether the 
state has the right to dictate what 
welfare payments may be spent 
on (not on pornography or alcohol, for instance), to what extent those 
communities may govern themselves, 
and who provides services to 
them. Underlying these issues is a 
broader question with a much longer 
history. Are Aboriginal people to 
be protected from themselves and 
others by the state, or should they 
be considered autonomous and self-
reliant communities? Should descendants of the original 
inhabitants of Australia be integrated with those of more 
recent immigrants, or should they be encouraged to live in 
splendid isolation? 
This debate in Australia was one facet of a much broader 
debate, waged across and beyond the British Empire as a 
whole. It related to Native Americans, First Nations, southern 
Africans and Maori as well as Australian Aboriginal people. 
It first came to a head in Australia and in the other colonies 
where Britons emigrated en masse, in the late 1830s. Two 
incidents crystallised the debate. In the rapidly expanding 
colony of New South Wales, seven British settlers, engaged 
in the business of ‘clearing the land’ for sheep farming, 
were hanged in 1838 for the murder 
of twenty eight Aboriginal people at Myall Creek. At the same time, in the extension of the colony known then as the Port Phillip District (now the state 
of Victoria), and in South Australia 
and Western Australia in different 
forms too, the British government 
established a new office to oversee 
colonization – the Protectorate of 
Aborigines. Both events manifested 
the British government’s belief that 
colonization could be reconciled with 
humanity, indeed accomplished with 
benefit to Indigenous peoples. Both 
events brought to a head a growing 
tension among British colonists and 
their supporters ‘at home’. 
Broadly, these tensions reflected a clash between missionary 
and humanitarian-inspired ideas of colonization on the 
one hand, and those espoused by the emigrant settlers 
undertaking the ‘work’ of Indigenous dispossession on 
the other.  The former were convinced that Providence 
had awarded the British with an unprecedentedly vast 
empire so that they could Christianise and ’civilize’ its 
inhabitants. The missionary press, evangelical ministers 
and officials and many among the growing British middle 
classes sustained this view.  For the emigrants and their 
supporters, though, wherever Indigenous peoples stood 
in the way of ‘settlement’ and ‘progress’ , it was legitimate 
to remove or overawe them, rather than seek to integrate 
them. Different ideas of racial difference underpinned each 
notion. For humanitarians, Indigenous peoples, including 
even Australia’s supposedly especially backward peoples, 
were innocents awaiting salvation through the light of 
God and instruction in civilization. For many settlers 
and their sympathisers in Britain, they were inherently 
savage, incapable of ever being assimilated into a modern, 
progressive society. By the late-nineteenth century most 
Britons assumed that these were ‘dying races’, doomed to 
disappear from the Earth through the natural processes of Darwinian selection. 
So, when the settlers responsible for the Myall Creek 
massacre were hanged (the only such instance of white men 
ever being executed for the murder of Aboriginal people), 
there was celebration among humanitarians that at last, 
the civilizing mission of empire was being taken seriously 
by the state. Humanitarian celebration was matched by 
settler outrage that civilised men should be punished for 
speeding up an inevitable process.
If the Myall Creek case aroused the ire of many settlers, 
the establishment of the Protectorate induced panic. Four 
men were appointed as Deputies under a 
Chief Protector. The man chosen for that 
job was the controversial George Augustus 
Robinson. His humanitarian sympathisers 
at the time saw him as the man who had 
just rescued the remnants of Van Diemen’s 
Land’s (Tasmania’s) Aboriginal population 
from annihilation at the hands of colonists 
during the colony’s Black War. His subsequent 
detractors have portrayed him as the 
architect of genocide, having condemned the 
Aboriginal survivors to a slow and painful 
demise through disease and neglect on the 
barren, windswept Flinders Island, to which 
he negotiated their exile. Serving under 
Robinson in Melbourne, the Protectors had 
magisterial powers to prosecute settlers for 
harm inflicted upon Aboriginal people and to 
reserve land for Aboriginal communities until such time as 
they could be assimilated within the new colonial society. 
In many settlers’ eyes, they threatened the entire scheme 
of colonization upon which the future of Australia, and 
indeed the British Empire, depended.
Indigenous peoples and the British Empire in Australia
By Alan Lester
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Indigenous peoples [...] 
were innocents awaiting 
salvation through the light 
of God and instruction 
in civilization. For 
many settlers and their sympathisers in Britain, they were inherently 
savage, incapable of ever 
being assimilated into 
a modern, progressive society.”
Ultimately the 
Protectorate failed and the effective punishment of white settlers who 
murdered aborigines in the act of colonization 
was never repeated. The extension of colonial 
frontiers in Queensland 
and the Northern 
Territory in the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries, 
beyond the colonies in which Protectorates 




and relatively little humanitarian concern.  
But it was not just settler opposition that saw to the 
whittling away of effective humanitarian power. It was 
also the resistance of Aboriginal communities themselves 
to a humanitarian civilizing mission, which called for the 
abandonment of cultures, languages and everyday routines 
that had endured in Australia for millennia. Although 
many remnant communities of Aboriginal people in the 
southern and eastern colonies had adapted to small scale 
farming on mission and Protectorate stations, they were 
tenacious in retaining as much autonomy over their lives 
as possible in these locations. Even in Tasmania, where the 
Aboriginal population is popularly thought to have been 
completely destroyed, descendants of Aboriginal women 
and white sealers and traders lived on as Aboriginal people, 
determined to preserve what they could of their ancestors’ 
cultures. Others, especially in the northern and western 
colonies, where there were fewer settlers, still fought to 
maintain more traditional ways of life. Their struggle 
continued throughout the twentieth century as the state 
attempted to enforce assimilation through the fostering 
of Aboriginal and so-called ‘half caste’ children to white 
parents and residential institutions. 
These nineteenth century events have been raked over by 
Australian commentators again and again, especially since 
the bicentenary of British colonization in 1988. Right wing 
commentators have sought to downplay and discredit claims 
of the violence enacted during colonization, celebrating 
instead the success of pioneer settlers in launching one of 
the most advanced economies and societies in the world. 
Rather perversely given the thrust of the ‘civilizing mission’, 
they have blamed humanitarians for fostering policies of 
Aboriginal separation from ‘mainstream’ (white) Australia 
because separate land holdings were reserved. Identifying 
‘separation’ as having failed Aboriginal communities, they 
advocate more forceful integration. Their critics, labelled 
by some as ‘black armband historians’, have persistently 
recalled not only the initial violence of 
colonization, but also the ways that it has 
been perpetuated 
precisely through the 
state’s authoritarian 
pursuit of integration. After all, it was only 
in the 1970s that the 
policies creating the 
‘Stolen Generations’ 
of Aboriginal children 
were phased out. Many of those who 
experienced the trauma of parental separation then 
underwent abuse in the institutions to which 
they were removed. 
The consequences are still evident, both in a widespread 
mistrust of the state and in a recurring pattern of family 
violence among some of those affected. 
Since the 1990s, legal processes have been established 
through which Aboriginal people can claim collective title 
to land, reversing centuries of denial that they could ever 
be considered ‘owners’ of their territory. However, the bar 
for qualification has been set very high. A continuity not 
only of occupation, but also of cultural practice on that land 
has to be established, putting recognition beyond the reach 
of hundreds of Aboriginal tribes already disappeared, 
decimated or displaced. Even this move towards 
recognition of a degree of Aboriginal autonomy within 
modern Australia, however, has prompted a backlash 
amongst the most vocal proponents of an assimilationist 
agenda.
The current ’Intervention’ in the Northern Territories, 
then, may have been prompted by contemporary concerns 
over alcoholism and child abuse, but it has antecedents 
located firmly in the conduct of British colonialism and 
in Australia’s place within a broader British Empire. The 
debates among Britons about that conduct in the early 
nineteenth century resonate today among Australians, and 
also among Americans, Canadians and New Zealanders. 
At the extremes, some call for the respect of Aboriginal 
autonomy, while others continue to advocate enforced 
assimilation. What seems to have been overlooked by many, 
both in the past and the present, and perhaps especially in 
Australia, is the need for consultation within and among 
Aboriginal communities. According to all the indices of 
infant mortality, health, employment and imprisonment 
they are the most marginalised people in Australia, but they 
refuse to behave homogeneously, and they decline to enact the role of passive recipients of policy, no matter how much 
a largely white state would like them to.
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An engraving of the 1838 Myall Creek Massacre of Aboriginal people at the hands 
of settlers (Image from ‘The Chronicles of Crime’ 1841). 
On 26 January 2015, the prime 
minister of Australia, Tony Abbott, 
head of a centre-right government in 
office since September 2013, stood 
beside a framed photograph of Queen 
Elizabeth II by the shores of Lake 
Burley Griffin in Canberra to announce 
that he had awarded a knighthood to 
her consort, Prince Philip. The incident 
was a reminder that Abbott had come 
to federal politics after serving as 
executive director of Australians for 
a Constitutional Monarchy. For the 
London-born Abbott, the son of an 
English father and Australian mother, Britishness forms the very cultural 
core of Australian national identity 
and conservative ideology. 
Abbott’s reintroduction of Australian knights and dames 
earlier in the year following their abolition in the 1980s 
had attracted criticism and ridicule in something like 
equal measure but it was as nothing compared with 
the decision to bestow such an honour on the Duke of 
Edinburgh. Even within the coalition he leads, there was 
almost no one prepared to defend the decision. Indeed, 
the announcement had the effect of further destabilising 
Abbott’s already fragile leadership. Within a few days, it 
became clear that there was a group of parliamentarians 
and ministers within the ruling coalition who thought 
the decision so bereft of good sense, so anachronistic, and 
so out-out-touch with the feelings of the overwhelming 
majority of Australians, that it suggested the prime 
minister should resign. A poll found that just 12 per cent 
of voters supported the award.
None of this should 
have been so surprising. 
J.R. Nethercote in his 
Oxford Companion to 
Australian Politics entry 
on ‘Conservatism’ 
commented that 
‘Australia, as a new nation in terms of European settlement, 
has not been fertile 
ground for conservative 
philosophy or practice’ 
but that ‘[c]onservative 
sentiment has been 
most evident in Imperial 
links and attachment to 
British connections and 
institutions’, although 
‘conservatism has been increasingly tempered by 
nationalism’.
Nethercote is broadly correct here, although the country 
does have conservative traditions stretching back into 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
that he does not acknowledge. While Louis Hartz 
and Richard Rosecrance presented Australia in The 
Founding New Societies (1964) as a ‘radical fragment’ of Europe, the early European settlement of Australia 
that began with the founding of a penal colony in 1788 
occurred in the age of conservative counter-revolution. 
Its early mode of government was autocratic, its policy 
preoccupied with fostering a state-sponsored landed 
class, deploying religion in defence of public order, and 
creating and maintaining social hierarchy. One of the earliest expressions of Australian conservatism was the 
conviction that social intercourse between the ‘free’ and 
the ‘freed’ – that is to say, ex-convicts – needed to be kept 
to a minimum, and that the state should be parsimonious 
in granting either material benefits or civil rights to the emancipist class. 
Historians of the emergence of free political institutions 
in Australia have also shown that conservative ideas 
contributed to the debate over the colonial constitutions 
adopted in the 1850s as the basis of self-government. 
Australian conservatives of the mid-nineteenth century 
deplored the idea of male suffrage and vote by ballot, 
equating democracy with anarchy. They preferred 
tradition over experiment, hierarchy over autonomy. One 
of the most articulate of the colonial conservatives, James 
Macarthur, presided over a little community in Camden 
near Sydney that in its paternalism and hierarchy would 
have been instantly recognisable to anyone familiar with 
the English lord of the manor’s authority over his estate. 
The colonial politician 
W.C. Wentworth’s proposal for an 
Australian nobility that 
would inhabit a colonial 
House of Lords was 
derided as a scheme for 
a ‘bunyip aristocracy’, yet each colonial parliament nonetheless 
established an upper 
house designed to act 
as a brake on radical 
democracy. And they 
largely did so – in some 
cases for generations. 
In sum, conservatism was never entirely 
vanquished.
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A knight’s tale: Australian Conservatism
By Frank Bongiorno
Parliament House, Canberra. Opened in 1988, it replaced the provisional Parliament 
House building from 1927. The building reflects the distinctive character of the Australian 
democracy and its historical proximity but geographical distance from Europe.
For about a century from 1860, 
flamboyant support for the British 
Empire and the 
baubles attached 
to it – such as the imperial honours 
system – was one of the most important 
ways that Australia’s c o n s e r v a t i v e s 
signalled their conservatism in a 
democracy without 
an established 
church or landed 
aristocracy. That no Australian political 
party called itself 
‘ c o n s e r v a t i v e ’ 
signalled the 
s y m b o l i c 
defensiveness of c o n s e r v a t i s m . 
Australians believed they were pioneering a ‘new’ country, 
British in inspiration but offering the enterprising and 
industrious a better life than available in the ‘old’ world. To 
use the term ‘conservative’ in this context would have been 
drastically counter-cultural and politically suicidal. But as the 
historian Cameron Hazlehurst commented in introducing a collection of historical essays on Australian Conservatism in 
1979, ‘neither politically prudential reticence nor the obvious 
differences between Australia and Great Britain’ should be 
taken as indicating the lack of an Australian conservatism. 
With the decline of Australian Britishness from the time of 
Britain’s first failed effort to enter the European Economic 
Community in the early 1960s, the old imperial anchor 
became of dubious value to the parties of the centre–right. 
Some of their members abandoned it only reluctantly. 
Robert Menzies, the long-serving Anglophile prime minister 
of Australia, became increasingly disgruntled in his final 
years in office during the 1960s about the end of the British 
Commonwealth as an exclusive white club. For about a 
quarter of a century after his retirement in 1966, the parties 
of the centre-right – the Liberal Party and its usual partner 
in government, the Country Party – struggled to articulate 
an ideology and vision to replace their previous attachment to Britain. 
In the years between about 1972 and 1996, national politics 
in Australia was dominated by the Labor Party, reversing 
a half-century of conservative hegemony. Labor, too, had 
identified with Britishness, but in a more measured and 
qualified way that placed greater emphasis on Australian 
independence. So where Labor embraced a ‘new nationalism’ 
with considerable enthusiasm in the 1970s, the parties 
of the centre-
right were more 
ambivalent, less sure of themselves.Part of the 
difficulty the 
Liberal and Country (later 
called the National) parties 
faced was that 
they had tended 
to meld liberal 
and conservative 
ideologies in ways 
that made sense in 
terms of everyday 
politics, but which 
contributed to 
an ideological crisis when two 
development s 
came together 
in the mid-1970s 
– the need to forge a post-imperial national identity, and 
the end of the long post-war economic boom. The initial 
solution, under Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser (1975-83), 
was to fuse a conservative paternalism wary of disturbing 
existing practices and institutions, a liberalism that 
strongly repudiated racial discrimination and embraced 
multiculturalism, and a revivified anti-communism and 
economic austerity. The Fraser Government was much 
more Heath than Thatcher; anti-union in rhetoric, but still 
inclined to treat the union movement as a recognised, if 
resented estate, rather than an enemy to be humbled. Fraser 
embraced the Commonwealth, but more as a multilateral, 
multiracial association that echoed in the wider world the 
kind of multicultural identity he was promoting at home. It 
was no longer an expression of antipodean Britishness. 
After his government was defeated at the election of March 
1983, the centre-right in Australia came to repudiate the 
Fraser years as an era of missed opportunities and policy 
failures. Modern Australian conservatism was born in the 
1980s out of this sense of failure. It looked to Reagan and 
Thatcher for inspiration, rather than to its own past which 
it associated with an excessive level of state intervention 
in the economy, as well as an unwillingness to challenge 
rent-seeking vested interests. Through the right-wing think 
tanks that either revived or commenced operations in the 
mid-1970s, the ideas associated with public choice theory 
swept through the whole political and administrative 
system and had a notable impact on Liberal Party ideology. 
And the radically free-market, neo-conservative turn 
of Rupert Murdoch was also significant because of his 
increasing domination of the Australian media during the 
1980s.
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Tony Abbott, the Australian Prime Minister (left), caused a stir when announcing on Australia 
Day 2015 that Prince Philip, the Duke of Edinburgh, would be awarded a knighthood for a long 
life of duty and service and as a ”great servant” of Australia. Abbott had decided in 2014 to restore 
knights and dames to the honours system, awards that are signed off by the Queen and which 
allegedly romanticise Britain’s relations to Australia through the monarchy.
The political project of combining conservative and 
liberal ideological strands had been central to the 
modern Liberal Party since its foundation in the 1940s. 
Menzies was the key figure in this project in the mid-
twentieth century; he had needed to reconcile the arrival of the Keynesian welfare state with a more 
traditional emphasis on individual initiative and family self-reliance. But the late twentieth-century iteration 
of the project was indebted in equal measure to John 
Howard, who would serve as prime minister for more 
than eleven years (1996 and 2007), making him the 
country’s second-longest serving prime minister after Menzies. 
A key document for understanding the new conservatism, Future Directions, appeared at the end 
of 1988, the bicentenary of European settlement, 
when Howard was still opposition leader. At the time, 
Australian federal politics was dominated by the 
Hawke Labor government in its third term. It had since 
1983 combined deregulation of the economy with 
carefully-targeted social policy spending and cultural 
nationalism; a ‘Third Way’ social democracy that 
foreshadowed, and to some extent inspired, the later 
Blairite project. Future Directions, then, was an effort 
to define a philosophy for the Australian centre-right, 
when so much of what it wanted to achieve was already 
being accomplished by its Labor opponent. 
The political failure of Future Directions – John 
Howard would lose the party leadership in 1989 and the coalition the election 
of 1990 – has obscured the extent to which it 
articulated most of the key elements of a new 
balance of conservatism 
and liberalism in centre-
right politics. Future 
Directions advocated a 
much reduced role for the state in the economy 
– going even further than 
Labor in this respect – but 
it appealed to citizens’ insecurity in a time of 
rapid change, promising to restore a lost structure 
and order. It emphasised unitary nationalism, parental authority 
and family values, 
and it played down multiculturalism. But like the new conservatism 
elsewhere, it advocated a free-market economic 
agenda that seemed 
likely to increase people’s insecurity at the same time 
as it promised the comfort and certainty of traditional 
values and morality. ‘In time’, however, as John Howard 
recalled in his memoirs, ‘it would be seen as the 
document which foretold much of the philosophical 
direction of the government I would lead from 1996 ... I 
believed in every element of Future Directions’. 
Howard self-consciously fused liberal and conservative 
traditions, advocating market liberalism (always 
moderated by electoral opportunism) and a 
conservative patriotism based on the ‘aspirational’ 
values of families and the protection of national 
borders against external ‘threats’. Most famously, 
Howard successfully fought the 2001 election over the 
question of asylum-seeker boat arrivals in a climate of 
public – or at least media – hysteria. An architect of this 
victory, Lynton Crosby, has subsequently made a career 
working for Tories and tobacco in Britain. His initial 
attempt to export the Australian Liberals’ xenophobic 
appeal into British politics met with a rebuff at the 
2005 election, but he experienced subsequent success 
with Boris Johnson in mayoral elections, and he is an 
adviser to the Conservative Party in the lead-up to the 2015 election. 
Howard was a constitutional monarchist who opposed 
the republic in the 1999 referendum. But there were 
no knighthoods, for members of the royal family or 
for anyone else, during his prime ministership, and 
he has criticised their reintroduction in Australia. His conservatism was 
revivified by the idea 
of an Anglosphere 
that accompanied the war on terror after 
9/11, for it allowed 
Howard to forge a close personal relationship 
with George W. Bush while simultaneously 
strengthening relations 
with the United Kingdom. 
Howard’s ability to seize such opportunities 
while tying them into 
Liberal Party tradition, 
Australian history and 
the ‘the national interest’ was a key to his political 
longevity. Tony Abbott 
has so far failed to emulate 
this success; his knight’s 
tale has instead seemed 
like an anachronistic and 
self-indulgent creation of 
a zombie.
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John Howard, Prime Minister of Australia between 1996 and 2007 and 
quintessential to developments in Australian conservative ideology in recent 
years. ”His conservatism was revivified by the idea of an Anglosphere that 
accompanied the war on terror after 9/11, for it allowed Howard to forge a close 
personal relationship with George W. Bush while simultaneously strengthening 
relations with the UK..”
One hundred and twenty four 
years ago the working people of the 
Australian colonies created a then 
unique type of political organisation: 
a ‘Labor’ party explicitly supported 
by trade unionists. One version of 
Australian Labor’s birth holds that 
the party was formed by striking 
shearers under the branches of 
the famed ‘Tree Of Knowledge’ 
in the regional Queensland town 
of Barcaldine during mid-1891; a 
counter-version asserts that the first 
Labor saplings burst into life the 
same year but in the less romantic 
surrounds of the working-class inner-
city Sydney suburb of Balmain.
Whatever their veracity, both stories 
of Labor’s birth testify to the party’s 
broad church nature. From the 
outset, Labor sought to represent all 
Australians, whether they dwelled in 
the city or rural areas (‘the bush’), or 
worked with their head or their hands. Labor has also 
attracted a diverse range of members, parliamentary 
representatives, leaders and opponents. The other 
constant of Labor’s history is its links with the union 
movement. Australian Labor was founded by unionists 
and unions continue to play a formal role in the party’s 
structure as affiliates, unlike many 
of their social democratic brethren 
in Britain and elsewhere on the continent.
The rise of the ALP however cannot 
be seen in isolation. The party arose at a time when other socialist 
parties came into existence and 
its ideological influences and 
leading activists were drawn from overseas countries, in particular the imperial power that 
established Australia as a penal 
colony and later a democratic white-settler society, Britain. 
From the 1850s following the 
lead of their British brethren, 
Australians formed small-
scale, city-based ‘craft unions’ 
representing skilled and semi-
skilled workers in a particular 
trade. Indeed, the Amalgamated 
Society of Engineers was a 
‘branch’ of the British union. The influence of the British 
chartist movement, many of whose members had been 
transported as convicts, shaped the outlook of early 
radicals and unionists. Collective identity was likewise 
expressed by the formation of coalmining lodges. But in 
an important respect the Australian labour movement 
deviated from the British experience. In Australia, 
industries were biased towards primary production 
such as wool, mining and agriculture, meaning that 
the Australian working class was more far more rural 
in nature and less classically proletarian. This would 
have important repercussions on the ideological nature 
and electoral appeal of the ALP which tended to be 
more pragmatic and populist in its outlook, attracting 
the support of many small-scale farmers. The nation’s 
largest and most influential union, The Australian 
Workers’ Union (AWU), a primarily rural and shearing-
based organisation in the manner of industry-wide 
‘new’ unions that emerged in Britain, came to exert a 
particularly strong sway over the early Labor party, especially in New South Wales.
Early Labor’s leading politicians and publicists were 
often British-born. Two child miners, William Spence, a 
co-founder of the AWU and Labor politician, and Andrew 
Fisher, a three-time Prime Minister, were each born 
in Scotland, while the latter’s controversial successor, 
Billy Hughes, was of Welsh-background but London-
born. Henry Boote, arguably the most influential 
labour movement journalist of his time as editor of the 
AWU’s Brisbane Worker and 
Australian Worker newspapers, 
hailed from Liverpool, while his 
predecessor William Lane was 
born in Bristol. Prominent British 
unionists and socialists Ben 
Tillett and Tom Mann, leading 
figures in the 1889 London Dock strike that Australians workers 
enthusiastically supported in 
moral and financial terms, each 
toured Australia. Mann eventually 
settled in Melbourne where in the 
1900s he played an important role 
organising for the Victorian Labor 
Party. Fisher was influenced by 
and shared a close friendship with 
British Labour leader Keir Hardie. 
Most of these early Labor figures, 
while proud of their Britishness, 
believed that their movement was 
helping to create a New World 
society impossible to replicate in 
the class-ridden Old World. 
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The early Australian Labor Party: leading from the front?
By Nick Dyrenfurth
Nick Dyrenfurth is a 
Lecturer at the National 
Centre for Australian 
Studies, Monash Uni-
versity. He is the author 
or editor of several books 
on Australian labour and 
political history as well as 
having published widely 
in leading academic jour-
nals. The article draws 
on his book with Frank 
Bongiorno, A Little His-
tory of the Australian 
Labor Party (2011) as 
well as his own Heroes 
and Villains: the Rise 
and Fall of the Early 
Australian Labor 
Party (2011).
Chris Watson (1867-1941) served as the third Prime 
Minister of Australia in 1904. He was the first prime 
minister from the Australian Labour Party, and the 
first prime minister from the labour movement in the 
world. Of Chilean birth, with German and New Zealand 
ancestry, Watson also reflected the tapestry of different 
origins that formed Australia.
Of course Australian and British Labor’s founders shared 
a common goal: to create a more democratic, equal and 
just society than that which had emerged under free 
market capitalism. They also shared similar beliefs about 
how that society would be brought into being: ethical 
socialism, Fabianism and cooperatives were among the 
answers. Many early labour activists were more informed 
by the teachings of Methodism than Marxism. Practically-
speaking, ‘One person, one vote’, compulsory conciliation 
and arbitration, public ownership of monopolies and old 
age pensions were just some of the policies Australian 
Labor proposed in order to bring their vision of ‘socialist’ 
society into existence. Yet the party’s egalitarian nation-
building ethos was limited by its xenophobic nationalism 
and commitment to the racially discriminatory federal 
legislation known as White Australia (1901) which saw 
Chinese and Melanesian labourers repatriated.
Labor’s electoral success was extraordinary. In the 
then colony of Queensland, Andy Dawson, an ex-miner, 
formed the world’s first Labor government during late 
1899. Dawson’s ministry lasted a mere week but just 
five years later, and with the Australians colonies having 
federated into a new nation-state in 1901, Chris Watson, 
a one-time stable hand and journalist, became prime 
minister of a minority administration in April 1904, 
the world’s first national Labor government. (Of the 
comparatively young, self-educated men who made up 
the first federal Labor caucus of 1901, 13 were overseas-
born, including seven Scots). In a move repeated over 
the years, Labor’s opponents formed a coalition in order 
to slow the progress of what had, in 1908, officially 
become known as the ‘Australian Labor Party’. Unlike its 
European cousins Labor wore its nationalism as a badge 
of pride. In 1910, the first Labor Speaker of the House 
and President of the Senate dispensed with British-style 
wigs and gowns, while the postmaster-general issued 
stamps on which, instead of a portrait of King George V, 
there was a kangaroo on a map of Australia. Yet, all the 
while, Australian Labor remained firmly supportive of the British Empire.  
‘That the workers should rule is a thought that rankles 
in their hearts’, announced the Labor-friendly Worker 
newspaper of the party’s conservative enemies. More 
heartache was in store for Labor’s opponents. Following 
a sweeping election victory in April 1910, a former child 
miner, Andrew Fisher, took charge of the world’s first 
majority Labor government. In the same year, Australians 
elected Labor state governments in New South Wales 
and South Australia. When Labor surprisingly lost 
the 1913 federal election Boote counselled readers of the Australian Worker against disappointment: ‘We 
have reached a stage of progress which has no parallel 
elsewhere on earth. A Labor government here is no 
longer a wild improbability, but the probable outcome 
of every appeal.’ Whereas the British Labour Party 
was still little more than a parliamentary rump, barely 
distinguishable from the Liberals, and socialist parties in 
France and Germany remained remote from real power, 
in Australia the planks of Labor’s platform were being 
made law. No Labor party existed at all in the United 
States. By 1914, Labor had held office four times federally 
as well as in every single state. 
Prior to its fall, key to Australian Labor’s world-leading early achievements was its novel form of union-
inspired internal democracy. For the first time, working 
Australians would select their own parliamentary 
candidates, help frame policy platforms and coordinate 
election campaigns through their local branches. Internal 
democracy was also deemed necessary in parliament. 
Labor politicians were required to sign a ‘pledge’ binding 
them to majority decisions of caucus and, unlike their 
rivals, were strictly guided by the party’s platform, 
determined collectively at a regular, usually annual 
conference, where affiliated unions remain formally 
represented. 
During the Great War, however, Labor’s forward march 
was halted. In 1916 the only social democratic party 
charged with governing the affairs of a wartime nation split over the issue of military conscription for overseas 
service in aid of the British Empire, leading to the 
expulsions of Prime Minister Hughes and luminaries 
such as Spence and Watson. A new generation of more 
self-consciously Australian activists, often of Irish-
Catholic background, emerged to dominate the party. 
Henceforth, a Labor Party that had shifted to the left of 
the political spectrum, and more narrowly based on the 
blue-collar industrial working-class\, would be subject 
to charges from its opponents that it was ‘disloyal’ to the 
British Empire and thus to the Australian nation. 
Throughout its century-plus history, critics, and even 
a few supporters, have written off Australian Labor at 
their own peril. Labor is the only political party to have 
existed since federation in 1901, enduring through 
three serious splits, two world wars, a great depression 
and many other crises. It has influenced and drawn 
inspiration from Britain during these times, from Gough 
Whitlam’s adaptation of Anthony Crosland’s ideas during 
the 1960s to the pioneering of what became known as 
the Third Way in the 1980s and 1990s governments 
of Bob Hawke and Paul Keating. As Australian Labor 
prepares to celebrate its 125th birthday some of the 
problems Labor and other social democratic parties 
presently confronts are unprecedented. Others recall the 
challenges of the past. One lesson from Labor’s history is 
very clear. The party’s ability to renew itself in order to 
form governments of a reformist bent for another century 
and more will not be possible without the commitment 
of thousands of ordinary working men and women who 
have made the Labor cause their own. It will be task of 
renewal not undertaken in antipodean isolation.
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Look up at the Australian flag and one 
thing is immediately obvious.  Almost 
as far away from Britain as it’s possible 
to get (there’s always New Zealand) the 
flags of both ANZAC countries proclaim 
some kind of relationship with the 
United Kingdom.  Indeed, as famously 
quipped by the American comedian 
Jerry Seinfeld the six silver stars on the 
Australian flag suggest “Britain at night.”
Seinfield’s was a reasonable reaction. 
The Australian flag reveals a dynamism 
of design open to various interpretations. 
For many Australians, one such might be relief that Mother Britain is still there (or 
even here, the evidence our institutions 
and values).  The opposite reaction might 
be horror or suspicion that an adult son, 
yet to find a compatible partner in the 
neighbourhood, is still living with his mother, especially 
when there is doubt that Mother (and even Ma’am) is 
enthused by such enduring domestic devotion.  Either way, 
the symbol suggests dependence (and something about 
the national psyche?)  
Of course, perceptions of this kind might apply to any of 
the half dozen national flags with the Union Jack as their 
heraldic primary, but in Australia’s case – a huge country, 
of influence beyond that often realised – the apparent 
anomaly is even more remarkable. 
A seventh similar flag is even odder.  Hawaii - never a British 
possession at all, and formerly independent - has retained 
the flag of its historic indigenous monarchy, despite its 
status since 1898 as part of the USA, a republic. A further 
irony is that the Hawaiian flag derived from a goodwill 
gift of a Union Jack by British navigator and explorer 
George Vancouver to rising star Kamehameha, who made 
canny use of it in bringing the islands under his sway. 
The Australian flag on the other hand, a later rendition 
of ensigns of the local cluster of colonies, is the ultimate 
product of no such good-will.  British Australia began as 
a penal colony in a supposedly empty wilderness, and 
ironically again, for fleets of boat-persons and adventurers 
uninvited.
Despite its unpromising start as a de facto 
detention centre for people the British 
authorities wished to remove as far as 
possible from the British 
mainland, European 
Australia was praised at the end of its first century 
for having achieved a society enjoying some degree of 
equality. The Australians had achieved “socialisme sans 
doctrine” as the French writer Albert Métin argued in his 
book of that name published in 1901.
In that very climate of social innovation the current 
Australian flag was selected from more than 32,000 
suggestions entered in a public competition the same 
year. The result was far from innovatory: the selection 
panel was committed to adopting a design conforming to 
imperial flag usage, as established in 1867.
It is in this sense that it is accurate to say that the Australian 
flag was imposed, rather than freely or directly chosen 
by the people.  Even a popular unofficial flag long used in 
eastern Australian and adapted as that of the Federation 
movement (and despite its Union Jack) was in 1884 
deemed too different from colonial usage, and banned 
from use at sea.5 Although Prime Minister Edmund 
Barton recommended this flag as an option (on grounds 
of local usage), and despite formal protests at the time 
from the Australian Natives Association that the blue and 
red ensigns chosen instead were “too British,” the older 
Federation flag was again dismissed in London.  Prominent 
in celebrations at Federation, its use disappeared during 
the First World War, as a different sort of patriotism was 
promoted by a government eager to send more troops to 
fight for God, King and Country (i.e. the Empire). 
For most of the ensuing century, Australians were officially 
considered to be of “British” nationality, an identity directly 
linked with the monarchy, since all citizens of the Empire 
were British “subjects”, a point Australian passports 
asserted well into the 1960s. Conservative Governments 
throughout the 1950s and until 1972 sponsored a “Bring 
Out A Briton” drive as the mainstay of its immigration 
program.  Many came.  In a referendum even now, voters in 
such pockets of Little Britain as the satellite city of Elizabeth 
north of Adelaide are unlikely to support changing the flag. 
For its period and given the restrictions set by the imperial 
requirements, the Australian flag is arguably rather neat. 
Even if based on the ensign template for all the colonies, 
its design is a brilliant compromise, and if nothing else in 
current Australian society, the flag alone seems to say we are in lock-step with 
Britain. That, however, also means that the 
flag can be seen as an 
anachronism – and 
indeed a target in a 
world where terrorism 





British Politics Review Volume 10 | No. 1 | Winter 2015
Tony Burton is Secre-
tary of Flags Australia 
and Editor of the journal 
Crux Australis. Flags 
Australia is the operat-
ing name of the Flag 
Society of Australia Inc, 
which is a not-for-profit 
incorporated association 
that brings together 
individuals interested in 
researching, preserving 
and publishing informa-
tion on Australian and 
international flags.
Left: The (unofficial) NSW or Australian Ensign 1832-1898, rejected by Colonial Office 
London in 1884. Right: The NSW Ensign adapted and adopted as the flag of Federation 
in 1898.  Rejected by Colonial Office London in 1902, citing the 1884 precedent.
Official diffidence in 
encouraging or even testing 
other flag design possibilities 
is striking.  Perhaps political 
leaders now share an irrational 
and underground foreboding 
that the comforts of nationhood 
as known will be swamped by 
other cultures just as exotic as 
those British were to the First 
People, and which may underlie 
the resurgent cultivation of 
the ANZAC legend as if that 
were the cardinal myth of 
nationhood.  
If Australians ever get to vote 
on their inherited flag in a 
referendum (as New Zealand 
will before 20 September 
2017), it would have to be 
on the back of a stronger sense of cohesion in the face of multicultural pressures, 
including an accepted 
resolution of those Aboriginal.   
Australian governments, like the people, are rarely 
radical. This conservatism 
is not surprising given 
the dominance of British 
institutions and British 
imports adding to (or 
subtracting from) the local 
political talent pool.  Former 
prime minister, Sir Robert Menzies, 16 years in office 
(1949 to 1966), proudly proclaimed he was “British 
to his bootstraps”; while his predecessor Billy Hughes 
(albeit Welsh) did Australia no credit in seeking more 
cannon fodder in 1916-17 and by his parochial and 
imperial obsessions at Versailles.  There have been few 
star performers or real leaders since, even to the present 
mediocrity, slogans pretending to be policy, and policy the 
reverse of promises.  The flag, whatever its design, should 
not be mis-used for jingo-jacking, as happened at Cronulla 
beach in 2005, or as the plaything of electoral opportunism. 
If over-used in this way, the national flag will become a 
symbol of division. 
In this context, what passes for debate about the flag in 
its partisanship is nothing of the kind.  As in the Canadian 
case, and probably will be in New Zealand, prejudice, 
paranoia and propaganda keep both sides in their trenches, 
while alternative design suggested over 35 years have 
failed to gain traction – a possible, though not primary, 
reason why it may be difficult to change the flag - except 
by leadership or diktat (the latter alien to the Australian 
character).  However the 
real obstacle remains that 
of a oddly nebulous sense 
of national identity, unlike the many European nations that won their emancipation 
from empires and foreign occupation. 
The current Australian 
flag is not unreasonably 
defended as a sign of values that all who want to live here 
should learn and apply – a 
message only strengthened 
by the desperate atrocities of counterfeit caliphates.  As if there are no civic values as 
solid, stolid and relevant as 
those evolved over centuries 
of trial and error in the Misty 
Isles. The hot blood of the 
Celts, the stuff of legends, like 
sagas everywhere, is all very 
well, and the apocalypses of this early century have 
demonstrated the depths 
that despots will plumb. Like their British counterparts, mainstream Australians want no part of fanatical 
fancies and for this reason 
may be reluctant to fiddle with 
the flag – or with a republican 
alternative to the sedate 
pageantry and stability that 
suitably reticent Royals represent.
Apart from the association of the national flag with 
military sagas – such as ANZAC (and the liturgies of civic 
religion that have been sanctioned around it), one of the 
furphies still fostered about the Australian flag is that it and 
the constitutional order of monarchy are inseparable, any 
change in national symbols tantamount to destruction of 
all the solid civic values on which stability is based.  
A republic probably does entail a new flag (though it didn’t 
in Hawaii), but a new flag does not mean a republic. The 
muddled thinking, and what I have described elsewhere as a 
national neurosis, is exposed by the indigenous monarchies 
of the Commonwealth, each with distinctive flags, none 
of them with the Union Jack.  Canada changed its flag, yet 
remains a monarchy (and the British one at that).  Even so, 
the Australian flag seems an anomaly if 48 or the current 
53 members of the Commonwealth have understood and 
acted on the nation-building utility of adopting distinctive 
flags.  None of these flags in any way demean or diminish Britain.
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One of many post-Anzac recruitment posters calling for public 
meetings. Note the ambiguity about the ’Flag’ round which loyal 
citizens were expected to Rally – the Union Jack (Kitchener’s) or the 
relatively new Australian ensign – and the blue or the red? At the 
time this would not have even been a question, as Australians were 
unquestionably considered to belong to the ’British nation’ – a vague 
concept but definitely white.
Even if Australia’s were left the 
last ensign of its kind standing, 
the admiration society implied 
in the radiance of one flag 
reflected in that of the other ensures that it is still not 
distinctive in the way those of the other Commonwealth 
nations are.  Unless of course Australians secretly want to 
be British - which, apart from 
a few diehards, or eccentrics, 
is doubtful.  Imitation may be 
the highest form of flattery. 
However, a mutual admiration society is not a healthy 
relationship.  Flattery is not 
respect.  It is not even self-respect.
However puzzling (and not 
least to the Palace) the debate 
over the Australian flag is part 
of a wider quest for national 
identity in a supra-national 
world.  National identity 
cannot be created out of 
concocted nationalism, nor 
real patriotism defined as 
flag-waving. Soundly-based 
national identity requires an 
end to xenophobia and attendant scapegoating discerned 
in Australia’s history since European settlement for too 
long, of Aboriginal people and their descendants, yet to attain full equality in the opportunities of citizenship 
rather than regarded as exotica.  
This article has referred to the Hawaiian flag, a design 
anachronism of its own. Ironically, the Hawaiian 
instance, if not exactly its flag, is relevant as a forecast of 
Australia’s further evolution as the experimental state it 
has always been – and so far, a fairly successful one. As a 
nation of mainly city-dwellers, Australians will most likely 
become more cosmopolitan 
than already and evolve as a Hawaiian-type society, either 
under its similar national flag 
or some other design that may eventually win acceptance.  
Either way it may in the end not really matter that the Hawaiians or the Australians keep a relic of their history as 
their chief local symbol; the 
former Polynesian kingdom 
has evolved socially and so will Australia as most likely an 
Austronesian nation. That said, 
in the current era and order 
of nation-states, a distinctive 
flag is probably a better way of 
promoting this process than 
one perceived as a colonial anachronism.
The Australian flag is unlikely 
to change any time soon, mostly for political reasons 
and popular reluctance.  The 
local catalyst for change may 
in the end not be Britain, 
nor identification of national well-being with a foreign 
monarchy, but the decision reached in the New Zealand 
referendum.  
Until then, and absent any unforeseen but galvanising 
event, the Australian flag before anything else will continue to proclaim, to the confusion of some overseas, 
and the comfort of many at home, (or even vice-versa) an 
association of some kind with Britain.
Forthcoming edition of British Politics Review
The general election 
of 2010 reintroduced 
coalition government 
to Britain, and despite 
what was predicted by many at the time, the 
coalition survived the 
parliamentary term. The 
general election of 2015 
looks to become no less 
exiting. While the two main 
parties both struggle to 
garner sufficient support for a parliamentary 
majority, there is not only 
the Liberal Democrats 
that seek to challenge 
their hegemony, but 
UKIP, the Green Party 
and (within the bounds 
of Scotland) the Scottish National Party as well. 
The result is 
unpredictable not only in terms of which party 
will form a government, 
but whose support it will 
depend upon. What are that 
incumbent government’s achievements, which issues are at stake on 7 
May and what is likely to 
follow thereafter? 
The spring edition of British 
Politics Review is due to 
arrive in April 2015.
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No doubt at all under which flag Australians were called to 
serve in the ’Great War’ and no doubt of which ’volk’, missing the 
unconscious irony that the Germans were of the same ’race’.
